

# **Achieving Total War Goals with a Limited War Force:**

## **Convincing the Enemy to Accept Defeat**

**A Monograph  
by  
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<b>13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words)</b> Carl von Clausewitz, in his monumental work, <i>On War</i> , stated that in order to defeat an enemy, a military force must destroy both his means and his will to resist. Destroying an enemy's means to resist is quantifiable and can be done through superiority in numbers, firepower, and attrition. However, defeating an enemy's will to resist is not measurable and cannot be guaranteed through superior firepower or strength. Therefore, victory in war can be measured by not only how much of an enemy's means to resist is destroyed, but also by how much his will to resist is shattered. This monograph concludes that currently in Iraq, the United States is seeking a total war solution with a limited war force structure and mindset. The US is attempting to defeat the enemy's will to resist without the sustained passion of the people and without the total focus of the government. In order to achieve the desired results in Iraq, interagency coordination must be strengthened. The US military can solely and successfully conduct Phase III of an operation, which focuses on destroying an enemy's means to resist. However, Phase IV must be an interagency process if the US seeks to defeat an enemy's will to resist.				
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# **SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES**

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## Abstract

ACHIEVING TOTAL WAR GOALS WITH A LIMITED WAR FORCE: CONVINCING THE ENEMY TO ACCEPT DEFEAT by MAJ Joseph McCallion, Jr., US Army, 43 pages.

After toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein in a few weeks, the decisive operational maneuver victory was not enough to defeat the enemy's will to fight. Instead of challenging US forces in a conventional military battle, the enemy has now sought an asymmetrical fight through the use of suicide bombers, kidnappings, beheadings and improvised explosive devices in order to wear down US resolve. This monograph ascertains what is needed to completely defeat the enemy. More importantly, the monograph argues that when the Soviet Union dissolved, the military and policy makers should have recognized the paradigm shift in warfighting, which could lead in our quest for a total war solution without a nuclear exchange.

Carl von Clausewitz, in his monumental work, *On War*, stated that in order to defeat an enemy, a military force must destroy both his means and his will to resist. Destroying an enemy's means to resist is quantifiable and can be done through superiority in numbers, firepower and attrition. However, defeating an enemy's will to resist is not measurable and cannot be guaranteed through superior firepower or strength. Therefore, victory in war can be measured by not only how much of an enemy's means to resist is destroyed, but also by how much his will to resist is shattered.

Over the past century with the killing efficiency of modern weapons exponentially increasing, theorists have relied on technology to not only destroy the enemy's means to fight, but also ultimately defeat his will as well. Giulio Douhet pioneered the theory of Strategic Bombing by arguing that the aerial bombardment of an enemy's cities would terrorize and ultimately break the enemy's will to fight. Recently, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the theory of "Shock and Awe" was based upon a sudden, technologically superior firepower display, which would lead to the enemy realizing that resisting would be completely futile. Although the theories of defeating an enemy's will to resist through the use of technology are quite attractive, the reality of war always seems to prove those theories flawed.

Unconditional surrender was a policy used by the Allies in order to ensure the complete defeat of the Axis powers. Although decried by critics that it prolonged conflict and increased the number of war casualties, it was founded in the correct notion that a more lasting peace can only be achieved by defeating the will of the people to resist. This ultimately led to the occupation of both Germany and Japan. The cost associated with lengthy occupations was acceptable because World War II was a total war, which this country fought on the primary justification of national survival. Therefore, completely defeating an enemy and occupying his land have been associated with total war.

Since World War II, the United States has engaged in various conflicts that have been limited in nature. Max Boot argues in his book, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, that these limited wars are fought for the reasons of pacification, protection, punishment, or profiteering. Therefore, the United States has never engaged in these limited wars with the purpose of defeating an enemy's will to resist. Concurrently, after the Soviet Union acquired the atomic bomb in 1949, the United States believed that the next total war would be nuclear. Throughout the Cold War, the United States had embraced such concepts as Mutually Assured Destruction, massive retaliation, containment, and détente. After the Vietnam experience and the results of the Yom Kippur War, the US military leadership focused on creating a well trained and equipped force that could effectively defend against a conventional Soviet attack in the plains of Europe. Defeating an enemy's will to resist and occupying his land was something that the Soviets would attempt in Afghanistan, while the focus of the United States revolved around Active Defense and containing

the Communist threat to the eastern side of the Berlin Wall. Therefore, defeating an enemy's will to resist was not something that warranted consideration during the struggle between the nuclear armed Superpowers.

This monograph concludes that currently in Iraq, the United States is seeking a total war solution with a limited war force structure and mindset. The US is attempting to defeat the enemy's will to resist without the sustained passion of the people and without the total focus of the government. In order to achieve the desired results in Iraq, interagency coordination must be strengthened. The US military can solely and successfully conduct Phase III of an operation, which focuses on destroying the enemy's means to resist. However, Phase IV must be an interagency process if the US seeks to defeat an enemy's will to resist. Simultaneously and completely synchronized, the US must use all elements of national power to destroy an enemy nation's military and regime, build up their economy, government, national institutions and local security, and maintain their infrastructure and their cultural identity. This can only be accomplished through the collaboration of the various agencies of the US government.

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## INTRODUCTION

In war the result is never final...even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.<sup>1</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

After the fall of the statue of Saddam in Baghdad on April 9, 2003, the U.S. military had achieved another decisive victory in combat. This triumph would be followed by President Bush's announcement a few weeks later that major combat operations were over, which would signal to the world that the United States and its allies had won Operation Iraqi Freedom. This feeling of euphoria was short-lived as insurgent attacks would slowly grow and start to bleed U.S. forces by using hit and run tactics and attacking convoys. It became apparent that the United States had won the conventional force-on-force fight, and now the war had evolved into a counterinsurgency fight. The US military was able to destroy Iraq's means to fight as an army, but was unsuccessful in defeating its will to fight.

What are the conditions that must be met to convince an enemy to accept defeat after he has lost the operational level fight? Why did it seem that the US military was not prepared for difficulties and conflict after their operational maneuver victory? This monograph will analyze what it takes to completely defeat an enemy. Carl von Clausewitz in his monumental work, *On War*, stated that the way to defeat an enemy is to overcome both his total means to resist and the strength of his will to resist.<sup>2</sup> The US military is highly proficient in destroying an enemy's means to resist when it relates to conventional weapons such as tanks, planes, ships and troop formations. However, destroying an enemy's will to resist is much harder. First, there is the linear thinking that by destroying an enemy's means to resist, then his desire to fight will naturally be debilitated and he will accept defeat. Unfortunately, that rarely happens. Second, the US military has tried over the years to find the technological solution to enable the defeat of

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<sup>1</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976 ), 80.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 86.

the enemy's will. From the birth of strategic bombing to the recent display of "shock and awe" in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military has relied on technology and firepower overmatch to convince an enemy that he is beaten and that resistance is futile. Historical examples of instances where the US military was able to successfully destroy an enemy's means to resist and defeat his will to resist must be examined. Perhaps the defeat of an enemy's will to resist has only been identified and targeted in "total" wars and never in "limited" wars. Can the US military replicate those conditions from those previous "total" war successes for current and future "limited" wars?



## FIXATION ON THE DECISIVE BATTLE

It follows that the destruction of the enemy's force underlies all military actions; all plans are ultimately based on it, resting on it like an arch on its abutment.<sup>3</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

Clausewitz may have accurately depicted the fact that in order to completely defeat an enemy, an army must take away an enemy's means and will to resist. However, his discussion on center of gravity may have led to interpretations that have not served us as well. Clausewitz defines center of gravity as the "hub of all power and movement."<sup>4</sup> He also states that all mass and concentration of forces should be dedicated to attacking the enemy's center of gravity and this will ensure victory. The first problem is accurately identifying an enemy's center of gravity. Then it must be recognized that there can be different centers of gravity for the different levels of war. In addition, centers of gravity can possibly shift throughout a campaign. The problem with the center of gravity discussion is that it creates a fixation on it. It creates the illusion that the center of gravity is the golden linchpin. Once you identify it, attack it, and destroy it, the enemy will capitulate and victory will be yours. Unfortunately, war is not conducted that cleanly or smoothly. Centers of gravity are useful tools in helping commanders identify areas that must be attacked or threatened in order to beat an opposing army. However, they are just a guide or an azimuth to point you in the right direction for victory. Fixation on a center of gravity will lead to a military plan focused on the decisive battle and not on war termination or war resolution goals.

War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale.<sup>5</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

Another reason that the US military may become fixated on the decisive battle and not the war termination and resolution phase is due to the game-like outcome we seek.<sup>6</sup> Clausewitz

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 595.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>6</sup> Frederick S. Rudesheim, "Quick, Decisive Victory: Defining Maxim or Illusory Concept within Army Doctrine?," Advanced Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (May 1993): 30.

stated that war is just like a “duel on a larger scale.”<sup>7</sup> Even in the American culture of sports, many combat terms or analogies are made in sporting events. This game-like outcome or linear thinking expects a winner and a loser when the time runs out. Two armies should take to the field, fight the decisive fight, and then it is ultimately determined who is the conqueror and who is the conquered. However, war takes on a fight-like quality versus a game-like one.<sup>8</sup> This is more analogous to a street fight where one fighter may beat another for the time being. However, the defeated fighter will dust himself off and look toward another day where he can have another shot at victory. The next time he fights, he may arm himself or bring along friends. There are no rules and the end of the fight does not necessarily mean the end of the war. Physically beating someone does not necessarily translate into the defeat of his will to fight.

The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter-though not exclusively-of figures, and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it.<sup>9</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

A reason that the US military is proficient at destroying an enemy's means to fight, but not his will to fight is because one is tangible and the other is not. Going back to the street fighter example, the US military is like the street fighter who lifts weights everyday and practices his fighting techniques. He ensures himself that he will have the superior skills and strength in any fight he gets into. He may even find out about the abilities of his challengers and will determine how strong and how fast he must be to win a fight with the toughest of his challengers. However, what can this fighter do to take away another fighter's will to fight? He can hope to pummel him so bad that after recovering, the challenger will shy away from ever wanted to fight again. But there is no way to guarantee that. A real good beating may steel the challenger and focus him on doing everything in his power to see to the defeat of the victorious street fighter. Realizing that he may not be able to beat the champion in a hand to hand fight, he may seek to attack him the

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<sup>7</sup> Clausewitz, 75.

<sup>8</sup> Rudesheim, 30.

<sup>9</sup> Clausewitz, 77.

next time with weapons or with friends to create an overmatch. Therefore, it is easy to see how defeating one's means to fight is quantifiable. By analyzing an enemy's weapon systems, to include their technical abilities combined with their quantity, one military force can establish a correlation of forces with another. This is the hard science of war, and although this analysis is complex, a comparison can be done and a threshold established. Therefore, a country must ensure that it overmatches its enemy to set the conditions for success on the battlefield. However, the will to fight is intangible and it is almost impossible to accurately measure. The best predictive analysis and planning can only delineate what objectives may achieve the effects of defeat.

No one can accurately predict or measure an enemy's will to fight. Historical analysis may help to provide an educated guess at what can possibly defeat an enemy's will, but it will only be an untested theory. As conditions change, so will the enemy. In Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqi forces in and around Kuwait were completely willing to surrender when the coalition ground attack was launched. Many had believed that our awesome display of air power over the previous six-week period had broken their will to fight.<sup>10</sup> That is a very narrow view that does not take into account the morale of those troops on the front line and their belief in their cause. Extrapolating that scenario and assuming that Iraqis would easily surrender when their country was invaded by the US led coalition in 2003 had definitely misjudged the effect of the changed conditions on the Iraqi will to fight.

Still, no matter what the central feature of the enemy's power may be-the point on which your efforts must converge-the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin, and in every case will be a very significant feature of the campaign.<sup>11</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

There is a tendency to think of warfighting as a linear act. Even our doctrine, whether it is US Army doctrine or Joint doctrine, discusses battles and campaigns in the linear world of

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<sup>10</sup> Gian P. Gentile, "Investigating Oneself: The United States Air Force and its Evaluations of Air Power in War and Conflict," Advanced Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (May 2000): 11.

<sup>11</sup> Clausewitz, 596.

phases. It creates the impression that the fight on the ground will be linear with actions commencing and concluding based on time or an event. The conclusion of one phase will lead to the transition to the next. Of course, it is mentioned that phases may overlap, but this still does not break the planner out of the linear thinking model. Couple this linear thinking with the fixation on the enemy's center of gravity and the cultural expectation of game-like outcomes, the American way of war may really only focus on the decisive combat phase. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to label it as the American way of battle instead of a way of war.<sup>12</sup> This linear thinking should be replaced with a systems type thinking that would realize that the military cannot target and destroy a single component of an enemy nation's system, namely its military, and then feel that the war has been won. A nation's system is comprised of various elements such as the government and its leaders, the economy, the culture, the military, the information outlet and media, the infrastructure, and its internal security forces. These components interact with each other and cannot be separated from the system to be dealt with on an individual basis. Therefore, influencing one of these components of the nation's system will have direct repercussions with the other elements.

We can now see that the assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for purely military opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many governments do when they are planning a war, and ask them for purely military advice.<sup>13</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

There are three major reasons why the US believes war revolves around the destruction of the enemy's military. First, any other attempt to forcefully change a nation's government and impose your will on it cannot be done without the use of force. The main threat to that force will be the enemy's military power. It is not the only threat, but it is the one threat that is most visible and can stymie our efforts immediately. Therefore, to be successful in using force to impose our will, the threat must be eliminated. This elimination of the opposing force is a military operation

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<sup>12</sup> Antuilio J. Echiverria II, "Toward An American Way of War," Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, U.S. Army War College (March 2004): 7.

<sup>13</sup> Clausewitz, 607.

and it leads to the second reason. This country has been founded upon a separation between the civilian policy makers and the military leadership. Civilian leadership ultimately controls the military, but the interaction between the two is sometimes precarious. This deference by the policy makers to the military leadership to conduct the war creates a plan that is focused around the military operation and inadequately addresses the other components of the enemy nation's system that must be dealt with in a simultaneous fashion. The third reason that there is a fixation on the military operation because there is a feeling that if you defeat an enemy's army and destroy his means to fight, then his will to fight will naturally wane and lead to defeat. History demonstrates that this rarely happens, however, the wishful thinking still exists today.

American culture does not enjoy times of armed conflict. Americans want wars to be conducted as quickly as possible and with the least amount of casualties as possible on both sides. The visual images of the Highway of Death leading from Basra to Baghdad in Operation Desert Storm created political pressure to end the conflict quickly to avoid the impression of wanton killing.<sup>14</sup> In order to attempt to win the war quickly and with the least amount of casualties, the focus naturally becomes the quick destruction of the enemy's military. Precision weapons can expedite this destruction and mitigate the effects of collateral damage. The US military has invested in technology that can facilitate this quick destruction of an opposing military with even less numbers of troops required than ever in history. Prior to the industrial revolution, the kill ratio was about 1:1. Therefore, an army either could outnumber its enemy and fight an attrition battle to ensure victory, or it would have to rely on maneuver where it would be able to concentrate its forces at one point on the battlefield to overwhelm the enemy there, create a salient and break through. The industrial revolution began the production of weapons that could kill more efficiently. Couple those weapons with information superiority and precision guided accuracy and you find that the current kill ratio is well over 100:1 in favor of the US military.

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<sup>14</sup> H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 468.

The problem with this statistic is that it creates the impression that more can be done with less. That is only half accurate. You can destroy an enemy's military with less boots on the ground or tank treads in the sand, but you will not be able to affect the other components of the enemy's system without the sheer numbers of boots on the ground. The US military has advanced over the years to focus on increasing that kill ratio through technological weaponry advances. This approach definitely fits in with American culture. The quickest way to win a war is to destroy the enemy's military in the most efficient manner with the least amount of cost in friendly casualties. Almost seems too good to be true. It goes back to the game-like outcome that the American culture strives to achieve. As if war were a football game, the US wants to field the best team with the best equipment so that not only do we win, but the opposing team doesn't even score. Retired General Fred Franks commented in his autobiography about Operation Desert Storm that in combat, "when you win, you don't want to win close. You don't want a drama. You want to win 100-0, not 24-23."<sup>15</sup> This focus on the decisive battle has been sought after even since Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz. The main fixation here is the value that America places on human life. We highly value life and will do anything to avoid needless bloodshed. This creates an environment where the military operation is the biggest risk to losing American life. Therefore, appropriate amounts of attention and resources are focused on ensuring that we win this fight and protect our forces. That is why it is non negotiable that the destruction of the enemy's means to fight will always be the top priority. Take away the enemy's ability to inflict mass casualties and then deal with the rest later. This unfortunately has led the US military to focus on battle fighting instead of war fighting.

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<sup>15</sup> Tom Clancy and Fred Franks, Jr., *Into the Storm* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1997), 32.

## SLIDING SCALE OF VICTORY

If in conclusion we consider the total concept of victory, we find that it consists of three elements:

1. The enemy's greater loss of material strength
2. His loss of morale
3. His open admission of the above by giving up his intentions.<sup>16</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

By accepting Clausewitz's definition that victory is achieved by the destruction of both the enemy's means and will to fight, then what are the results when these aspects are not completely achieved? The reality in warfare is that it is difficult to achieve both of these aspects. Political restraints usually trump tactical considerations. If the linear theory, which is the destruction of the enemy's means to fight eventually leads to the debilitation of his will to fight, is correct, then the force that can quickly and decisively destroy another will expediently achieve total victory. This type of rationale led to the tremendous industrial production of weapons and armament throughout the last century. Despite this, however, total victory still remained elusive. As the efficient killing potential of soldiers increased with the introduction of more lethal weapons, defeating a nation's will was still hard to do. MAJ Thomas Shoffner offers an interesting model of what he calls the 'sliding scale of victory.'<sup>17</sup> Through his analysis of Clausewitz's Chapter Four of Book Four, Shoffner creates a metric to measure victories based on their ability to defeat the means and will of the enemy. A decisive victory is one where the enemy is completely defeated by losing both his means to resist and his will to resist.<sup>18</sup> This is obviously what we would strive for in warfare because it sets the stage for a long lasting peace. Germany and Japan in 1945 are examples of a decisive victory where the Allies defeated both the enemy's war fighting capabilities and his will to resist. The other end of the spectrum is the indecisive victory where the enemy may have lost the campaign but retain some of their war


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<sup>16</sup> Clausewitz, 233-234.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas A. Shoffner, "Unconditional Surrender: A Modern Paradox," Advanced Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (May 2003): 13.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

fighting capabilities and have not lost their will to fight.<sup>19</sup> Desert Storm can be used as an example in this paradigm because Saddam Hussein's regime still possessed the means to fight and their will to fight was not broken.



The problem with this model is that it is devoid of the objectives in warfare. To classify victory in war by the destruction of the enemy's means to fight and the breaking of his will helps to simplify warfare, but it does not consider all of the other political objectives and motivations. In 1973, Egypt declared a victory by attacking across the Suez and capturing positions in the Sinai. Eventually, the Israelis recovered from Egypt's initial successes and pushed the Egyptian forces back across the Suez canal. However, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat considered the operation a tremendous success. The 1973 war was successful in that it removed the Israeli

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.



feeling of invincibility, elevated the conflict to the focus of the Superpowers, removed the Israelis from the Sinai peninsula albeit through a United Nations resolution, and most importantly to Sadat, it raised the feeling of pride in the Arab people. In Desert Storm, the objective was to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The US led coalition was tremendously successful in doing that. However, the Sliding Scale of Victory does not, and would be improbable to do so, take into consideration all of the other objectives, motivations, and policies that may lead to armed conflict. The model is useful, however, when the objective is total defeat of the enemy. The US military is the most technologically advanced and best trained fighting force in the world. There is no doubt that it can destroy an enemy nation's means to fight more efficiently than any other fighting force in the history of the world. Superior equipment and technological advances have contributed greatly to our destructive power. Can technology also help us to defeat an enemy's will to fight?

## TECHNOLOGY FROM STRATEGIC BOMBING TO SHOCK AND AWE

How are we to counter the highly sophisticated theory that supposes it possible for a particularly ingenious method of inflicting minor direct damage on the enemy's forces and control of his will-power as to constitute a significant shortcut to victory?<sup>20</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

Defeating an enemy's will to fight is difficult not only because it cannot be quantifiably measured throughout conflict, but also because it entails occupation of their territory, which is very costly politically, militarily and economically. Clausewitz, when discussing the defeat of the enemy, stated, "If we wish to gain total victory, then the destruction of his armed forces is the most appropriate action and the occupation of his territory only a consequence."<sup>21</sup> However, that statement was made from his insights gained during the Napoleonic era. Have technological advances since then been able to achieve total victory without the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and the occupation of his territory?

Interestingly enough, many theorists have proposed solutions that would achieve that type of success. From strategic bombing to "shock and awe," there has been a quest to find that technological silver bullet that will crush the will of the people to fight and bring conflict to rapid termination. Giulio Douhet, the Italian air power theorist, wrote an influential work in the interwar period called, *The Command of the Air*. Douhet's thesis was that with the recent advent of the airplane, warfare would be completely changed. Air power would be able to break the stalemate that trench warfare created and win the war quickly. Douhet felt that air power could directly target a nation's resources and their will to fight.<sup>22</sup> Defeat their will to fight and the national leadership and the military will no longer fight. He felt the best way to crush their will would be to bomb civilian population centers and bring the destruction to the defenseless. He

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<sup>20</sup> Clausewitz, 228.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>22</sup> Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), 188.

believed the people would then be so terrified and feel so helpless, they would force their country to sue for peace to stop the bombardment.<sup>23</sup> Douhet's theory is interesting in that it generated the doctrine of strategic bombing in World War II. General Billy Mitchell and then General Hap Arnold were definite advocates of air power and felt that the target should be focused on the enemy nation's industrial centers and not its populace. Destroy the nation's warmaking capability and eventually they will no longer be able to supply their troops. The British, however, after suffering continuous bombings of London by the Germans, were seeking retaliation and became willing to put Douhet's theory to the test and target civilian population centers of the enemy in order to expedite the defeat of the will of the Germans.

Despite the conviction of Douhet's theory that air power would be a direct way to defeat an enemy's will to resist, the exact opposite seemed to happen. The more civilian population centers were bombed, the greater the resolve of the people became to support the war effort. The more innocents that were killed, the more those people realized that it was a fight to the death and everything had to be done to stop the enemy. Douhet could not predict the reaction of what people would do when bombed. He felt that a nation would respond in a rational way and look to sue for peace as soon as possible. Instead, the bombings strengthened the resolve and kept the passion of the people high, which actually made war termination harder to achieve.

Strategic bombing was a failed concept, or was it? Air power theorists went on to say that Douhet's theory actually did work. Bombing civilian cities would bring a nation to its knees, the only requirement is the destructive power of atomic bombs to shatter the nation's will.<sup>24</sup> The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki became the examples of strategic bombing and the 'silver bullet' that could end wars quickly. Did two bombs defeat an enemy nation's will to resist? The reason that this is a relevant question is because it reflects an American penchant to find technological solutions to difficult, human related conflicts. The atomic bomb was definitely

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>24</sup> Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 73.

a military revolution. This is due to the way it changed the nature of warfare. However, to make the claim that it could win wars due to the Japan experience is definitely an air power centric view and not considering all the other factors that contributed to the defeat of the Japanese. In order to understand how the will of the Japanese people to fight was shattered, there must be a greater analysis than just attributing it to the atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

First, it cannot be overlooked that the Japanese had been fighting wars nearly a decade before their attack on Pearl Harbor. 14 years of fighting had depleted the already scarce resources and the manpower of Japan. In addition to this exhaustion was the damage being inflicted on the home islands in the last year of the war by US airpower. The initial firebombing raid on Tokyo alone had produced over 185,000 casualties, which was almost double than that from the blasts of the atomic bombs.<sup>25</sup> By August of 1945, Japan had lost both its navy and its air force as viable fighting forces. The only force that remained was a depleted army, and that was to focus on defending the home islands from the impending invasion. In addition to the exhaustion experienced by both the populace and the military, the threat had just increased when the Russians had defeated the Kwangtung Army in Manchuria. This meant that the home islands could be threatened by not only an American invasion, but also by an impending Russian declaration of war on Japan.<sup>26</sup> After the atomic destruction of Nagasaki, the Emperor provided a suggestion to his military leaders on “bearing the unbearable” and accepting the defeat.<sup>27</sup> The Emperor stated:

I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be placed in fortified positions at Kujukuri-hama so that they would be ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. Even the equipment for the divisions which are to fight is insufficient and reportedly will not be adequate until after the middle of September. Furthermore, the promised increase in the

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<sup>25</sup> *The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (European War) (Pacific War)*, Reprinted by Air University Press (1987): 92.

<sup>26</sup> Robert J. C. Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), 154.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 176.

production of aircraft has not progressed in accordance with expectations. There are those who say that the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance.<sup>28</sup>

The Emperor did not allude to the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki or that those bombings had changed their plans on the war. He did not indicate that this new form of destruction had debilitated his will to fight. Instead, he pragmatically looked at the entire situation and realized the cumulative effect of the 14 years of war and the exhaustion of Japan's military forces. In reality, the capitulation of Japan was inevitable. The atomic bombs definitely expedited the process, and actually spared a tremendous amount of lives that would have been lost in a bloody invasion of the home islands. However, to isolate the atomic bombing of Japan as the sole factor which defeated the will of Japanese people to fight is entirely misleading. However, this theory of the shock effect of wiping out a city with one bomb has led to further misleading theories on how a technological weapon can cause the defeat of the will to fight.

Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war.<sup>29</sup>  
-Carl von Clausewitz

Colonel John A. Warden III, who wrote, *The Air Campaign*, was a preeminent air power theorist in the late 1980s, and believed in the ability of air power alone to defeat an enemy. He felt that with the technological advances that had been made with precision munitions, air power would be able to effectively target centers of gravity and bring about victory. Like a modern day Douhet advocate, Warden designed a model of an enemy's system, which would be made up with separate centers of gravity that represented their means to fight.<sup>30</sup> Simply put, Warden believed that precision decapitation strikes centered on the leadership and their command and control nodes would quickly disrupt an enemy's system.<sup>31</sup> Warden was able to see his theory in action

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 175.

<sup>29</sup> Clausewitz, 75.

<sup>30</sup> John A. Warden III, *The Air Campaign*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), 40.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 53-54.

during Operation Desert Storm. He was the main advocate who pushed for the strategic bombing of Baghdad and was convinced that precision bombing at the regime's leadership would result in Iraqi forces leaving Kuwait without the use of a ground campaign.<sup>32</sup> However, despite the use of the most sophisticated precision guided munitions ever used in warfare at that time and the quick achievement of air supremacy, the US led coalition forces still had to execute a ground campaign to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Instant Thunder, which the air campaign was named, obviously contributed to the overall accomplishment of the objective, but it failed to achieve it alone.

Just as the Industrial Age brought about more efficient ways to kill people and theories about how the use of this destructive power could defeat entire nations through the strategic targeting of their center of gravity, the Information Age has generated its theories on how information superiority coupled with precision guided munitions may be able to quickly overwhelm an enemy and "shock" him into submission. In 1996, Harlan Ullman and James Wade, Jr., wrote a paper for the National Defense University entitled, *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance*. Shock and Awe was a term that was mostly confined to the Defense establishment until it became one of the premier catch phrases of the air strikes in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The paper was intended to present a theory on how future warfare would be fought and how the United States could leverage its technological superiority to win future wars. The decade of the 90's saw the United States down sizing from the Cold War with no military peer competitor on the horizon. Therefore, their work was an attempt to foresee future requirements and ensure that the US could maintain its military dominance in an Information Age world where a huge Industrial Age structured military was no longer economically or politically acceptable.

Rapid Dominance was the theory that would produce the Shock and Awe that would bring an enemy to ultimate submission. Rapid Dominance is based around information

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<sup>32</sup> Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War*, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 188.

superiority, which theoretically provides near perfect intelligence and allows a military force to always be ahead of the enemy's decision cycle. Being able to target the enemy and deny him the ability to counter our strikes would leave the enemy with no choice but to surrender. Shock and Awe was supposed to create the "non-nuclear equivalent of the impact that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese."<sup>33</sup>

One of the major flaws with this theory is that it does not account for the enemy actions. It presents multiple ways to induce the desired effect of Shock and Awe on the enemy, and after implementing the rapid dominance, the enemy will believe any counter action is futile. Ullman and Wade caveat their premise of Rapid Dominance by adding a couple of requirements that must be met. "Rapid Dominance must be all-encompassing. It will require the means to anticipate and to counter all opposing moves."<sup>34</sup> The problem is that all technological advances have not been able to give us the means to anticipate what the enemy will do. The other main flaw with the theory is that the adversary is always assumed to be a rational actor and that once Rapid Dominance strikes key target sets with precision and denies him of certain avenues of escape, he will automatically capitulate. Unfortunately, that rarely happens. Shock and Awe can be directly related to strategic bombing and other air power theories that have evolved from it. All of these theories give tremendous weight to technological solutions and translate sheer destructive capability as the brass ring of dissolving an adversary's will to fight.

Strategic bombing is not successful for a number of reasons. These are the political restraints, leader responsiveness to their people, and the fact that nations are adaptive systems.<sup>35</sup> First, strategic bombing requires freedom from political restraints in order to be completely successful. In order to break the will of the people, it must be unleashed with absolutely no

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<sup>33</sup> Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 12.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>35</sup> Gary E. Phillips, "Strategic Bombing – A Decisive Military Force?" Advanced Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (May 1998): 76.

regard for the killing of innocent civilians or the reaction of world opinion. This is an unrealistic condition and it would be hard to believe that the United States would ever condone such action. Second, strategic bombing has to be used on governments or leaders that are responsive to their people.<sup>36</sup> In totalitarian regimes like Saddam's Iraq, the killing of the Iraqi citizens has absolutely no effect on his ability to govern or compromise. One of the reasons that the 1999 air war over Kosovo was effective was due to the fact that Slobodan Milosevic was responsive to the people. After the US targeted the electrical grid system of Belgrade, the people were willing to give up Milosevic for their electricity and namely the restoration of their way of life. Therefore, strategic bombing against a regime like that in North Korea would have little effect on breaking the will of the people or the regime to fight. Finally, nations are complex, adaptive systems that will overcome the effects of strategic bombing and will continue to find other means to survive. Realizing that they are complex, adaptive systems means that no one tactic or technology is going to be able to effectively bring down an enemy country like a house of cards by effectively targeting the 'golden linchpin.' Therefore, if technology does not deliver on its promises to quickly break the will of the enemy, what lessons can be learned from the last time the United States focused on defeating both the enemy's means and will to fight?

## **UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER**

One way to ensure the defeat of the enemy's will was through the policy of unconditional surrender. The rationale behind the policy was that the defeated nation would not be able to negotiate or put conditions in their surrender. Simply put, this was to ensure that the victors had completely won the war and the losing country would accept and realize their defeat. The term unconditional surrender had its origin with General Ulysses S. Grant in the American Civil War. It was then resurrected by the United States and the Allies in World War II. Unconditional

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<sup>36</sup> Stephen T. Hosmer, *Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), 95.



surrender is somewhat of a misnomer since the defeated countries ultimately did have conditions and negotiations for their surrender. Therefore, it was the effect of unconditional surrender that was most important, not its actual rigid definition.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt had confronted the problem of ensuring the defeat of an enemy's will after a destruction of his means to wage war. World War I had been a disaster due to its overall effect. It was a total war that had devastated Europe with an industrial age level of destruction never previously witnessed. Trench warfare and high attrition ended with the final defeat of the belligerent Germany. Unable to sustain offensive combat operations, the Germans had culminated and accepted war termination. The Treaty of Versailles had attempted to punish Germany for its aggression, but within 20 years of the treaty, Germany would have rebuilt its war machine and would be tearing through Europe and North Africa with blitzkrieg tactics. The problem with the Treaty of Versailles was that it while it punished Germany, it did not ensure the total defeat of their will to fight.<sup>37</sup> The German people did not have the war fought on their soil, and were not occupied by foreign troops. To most, the war was fought outside of the German borders and the impacts felt were minimal. Propaganda and nationalism were able to convince most Germans that they did not lose World War I, but instead they decided to halt offensive operations and cease combat. Therefore, German perception was that the conclusion of the war was not due to a German military defeat, but to a conscious decision on their own to make peace and end the hostilities in a stalemate.<sup>38</sup> With harsh monetary reparations and a feeling that they did not really lose the war, it can be seen how the conditions were set for Hitler and the Nazi Party to mobilize and inspire the nationalism needed to wage a world war. By the time of World War II, President Roosevelt saw the Treaty of Versailles as a failure that led to the rise of Nazi Germany. He felt that Germany needed to be

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<sup>37</sup> Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 217.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

occupied.<sup>39</sup> An occupation force that was visible to the citizens of German society would be the constant, daily reminder to the German people that they had lost the war and were truly defeated. President Roosevelt did not doubt the Allies' abilities to destroy Germany's means to fight, but he was concerned about how to defeat Germany's will to fight. He recognized that unless their will to fight was defeated, it would only be a couple of more decades before the world would find itself fighting them again. Even Senator Richard Russell had felt that leniency was the mistake in the termination of World War I. He stated that, "weak and half hearted methods" had cost America a "golden age of permanent peace."<sup>40</sup> Therefore, unconditional surrender was to ensure the defeat of their will to fight and more importantly to set the conditions to create a lasting peace.

Unconditional surrender seemed to be the perfect doctrine for total war. The country would mobilize all of its resources to destroy the enemy's means to fight, and then through unconditional surrender, the country could guarantee the defeat of the enemy's will to fight. Implementing this policy became a challenge especially since it seemed to imply that fighting would have to be overly destruction and over a large span of time to complete the surrender. It also suggested that war would be fought to produce a linear, neat and compartmentalized solution. First, take away his ability to fight and then dictate the terms of the surrender to complete the victory. It can be argued that a democratic country's center of gravity is the national will and the passion of the people. Unconditional surrender and the passion of the people are in a symbiotic relationship with each other.

Total war already stirs the passion of the people because it is a war of survival and based upon fear. That passion is kept high through a policy of unconditional surrender. It helps to give confidence in the war effort and assures the people that their country will secure

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<sup>39</sup> Michael Beschloss, *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman, and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 12.

<sup>40</sup> Michael D. Pearlman, *Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb*, (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1996), 18.

victory and set the conditions for an everlasting peace. It also provides a focus and an explanation for the war effort to the populace. It prepares the people for a long, hard fight and the possibility of a long occupation of a foreign country by our troops. More importantly, it sets a measurement of success that people can understand. Americans have a tremendous tolerance for sacrifice as long as they feel that their efforts and blood are not wasted. Unconditional surrender presents the feeling that the war will conclude with a permanent peace. The people can maintain their passion for the war with the feeling that the sacrifices made now will result in an everlasting peace. Government leaders can help to maintain this passion for war and the tolerance for sacrifice by classifying the struggle as the generation's task which will secure the peace for future generations. The American culture is willing to make sacrifices in order to make life better and the world a safer place for our children. Unconditional surrender policy helps to maintain this high passion for war because it guarantees the complete conquest of the enemy and it presents an ultimate vision of peace.<sup>41</sup>

While the unconditional surrender policy may help to lift the passion of the people and ensure the defeat of the enemy's will to fight, ironically, it also has the negative effect of draining the national will. When the enemy knows he is facing unconditional surrender, his incentive to fight until the last man is increased. There are no incentives to terminate combat operations when the enemy feels there is no chance to sue for peace and negotiate. The problem of unconditional surrender becomes evident when the enemy's means to fight are destroyed and the winning country has to expend more resources for the final push to destroy the enemy's will and gain unconditional surrender. This was evident in the summer of 1945. Germany was defeated and had surrendered. The focus was placed on the defeat of Japan. The Japanese navy and air force were destroyed and for the most part unable to influence further combat operations. All that was left for Japan was its army that was heavily entrenched in the home islands waiting

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 3.

to fight to the death under the code of “bushido” where a soldier was expected to either fight to the death or commit suicide before ever surrendering to the enemy. The plan for the invasion of the home islands of Japan looked to be costly and bloody. The invasion of Okinawa in the spring of 1945 was a brutal conflict which resulted in an estimated 10,000 American and 100,000 Japanese casualties. Estimates for the invasion of the home islands predicted around 50,000 American lives to implement the policy of unconditional surrender.<sup>42</sup> The other option was to starve the Japanese into surrender. The US Navy would surround the home islands and cut off its ability to supply itself. This method may have worked but even conservative estimates figured it would take years to implement.<sup>43</sup> After four years of war, the surrender of Germany, and over 300,000 American lives lost, the American public’s will to continue the war had begun to wane. Unconditional surrender may have stoked the flames of passion in the people earlier in the war, but by the summer of 1945 it was starting to look like overkill and too costly to implement.

Therefore, unconditional surrender did not happen with Japan. They surrendered on September 2, 1945, but there were conditions. Specifically, the emperor remained in power and was never held responsible for the conduct of the war. President Harry S. Truman recognized the importance of unconditional surrender and used it properly. He realized its importance to the people. Public opinion polls taken in 1945 showed a high public favorability rating for the unconditional surrender policy, however, their commitment to the actual implementation of the policy was slowly dying off. Truman skillfully treated unconditional surrender as a war cry instead of a policy.<sup>44</sup> He recognized that it sent a signal to the public and the military that there was a firm determination to fight to the end. It also demonstrated resolve to the Allies, specifically the Russians in this instance, that the coalition was strong and no one country would have back door negotiations with the enemy to end the conflict. Finally, Truman recognized that

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 8.

unconditional surrender sent a strong message to the enemy that there was no possible avenue for victory. This assured the complete defeat of the enemy's will to fight.

Unconditional surrender may be seen as a tool of total war that cannot diplomatically be implemented today without giving off the impression of a US quest for total world domination. However, there are some aspects of unconditional surrender that should be considered for the contemporary environment to ensure that the defeat of the enemy's will to fight remains in focus. First, the public support for the operation has to be high, and this can be done by classifying the war as one of survival versus one of interest and/or honor. This helps the public to realize that it is a war of necessity, not choice. If the public feels that there is a choice between war and peace, they will always look for the most expedient way to achieve peace. Therefore, war must be the last option and the public must understand that there is no alternative. In addition, the public must be given realistic expectations of how long and how much of a sacrifice it will be to fight the war. There must be an open-ended exit strategy, which is typically found in total wars. The war will last until the enemy has been completely defeated and a lasting peace is established. Limited wars focus on exit strategies and quick 'Band-Aid' fixes of symptoms of the tension instead of the root cause. Unconditional surrender helped to prepare the public for a long, costly war, but it focused on totally defeating the enemy, creating a true victory, and setting the conditions for an everlasting peace. Future policies should look to maintain the public support of the people through the same way that unconditional surrender served as a 'war cry' for the World War II generation. Anything less in today's information age will lead to an immediate drain on the passion of the people and their support of a war that ensures the defeat of the enemy's will to fight.

## TOTAL WAR VERSUS LIMITED WAR

What are the differences between total war and limited war? It is imperative that these terms are properly defined and classified. This will ensure an understanding that the wars the US may fight in the future may be a hybrid of the two. Total war is a war of survival. The ancient historian, Thucydides, cited three reasons that a nation will go to war. Those reasons are fear, interest, and honor.<sup>45</sup> Although every war may have parts of them blended together, conflicts at different levels focus on one more than the others. Total wars focus more on fear. This is a fear of being completely destroyed as a people or country. These become wars of survival and the nation will use all means of national power to wage these wars. The American Civil War and World War II were wars of survival and total wars. The key ingredient is the passion of the people, which runs fervently high due to that fear of being destroyed or dominated by another country. Survival is always the top priority of any nation state. Hence, the United States has always made it a focus to be able to fight and win the total war. In total war, there will be full mobilization and participation of the populace. Men of war fighting age will be conscripted into service and be expected to fight for the survival of the nation. The rest of the nation's citizens will be expected to sacrifice and work towards producing the means necessary for that nation to fight. Everyone has a vested interest in the winning of the war, and therefore, the public will steel itself to hardship and exhaust itself for survival. Fighting the war falls more on the military than on any other part of the government. Therefore, there is the possibility of establishing a "firebreak" between policy makers and the military leadership. The policy makers can set the strategic goals, which are unrestrained due to the fight for survival, and the military leaders can have greater latitude to fight the war in the best way they see possible to win the conflict for the nation. In total war, the military can focus on defeating an enemy nation by first destroying their means to fight and then conducting a regime change followed by martial law to ensure that their

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<sup>45</sup> Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. and ed. Rex Warner, (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), 80.

will to fight has been defeated. This requires occupation of the enemy nation by a constabulary force that will provide security during the leadership vacuum phase and through the transition to a new form of government.<sup>46</sup> Finally, in total war there is the open-end exit strategy. The goal is the defeat of both the enemy's means and will to fight followed by the setting of the conditions to lead to a lasting peace between the warring nations, no matter how long it takes.

Conversely, limited wars are wars that we choose to fight. The other two causes of war that Thucydides mentioned, interest and honor, are ones that are more likely to be found in limited wars. Max Boot, in his book, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, argues that the majority of wars fought by the United States have been "small" wars or limited wars. He cites the four reasons that America fights in these limited wars, and classified them into the categories of pacification, protection, punishment, or profiteering.<sup>47</sup> These objectives are more obscure and make it more challenging for the military to prepare for and fight these limited engagements. The military may use its conventional prowess and lethality to attack and destroy an enemy's ability or means to wage war, but defeating his will to fight is not considered. The main reason for this is how costly it is to defeat an enemy's will to fight. A problem in the limited wars in the Cold War paradigm was that if the United States decided to accomplish total war goals of the destruction of an enemy's means and will to fight, they would have to believe that the Soviet Union would step in and escalate the conflict. Such as China jumped into the Korean conflict, there was no reason to believe that China and eventually the Soviet Union would not jump in if the US decided to take the Vietnam conflict north of the 17<sup>th</sup> parallel. The key to limited wars is that they are wars that are not threatening the survival of the country, but the country embarks upon them because they feel that action will create an overall better environment than not doing anything. Instead of having full mobilization of the nation's power, limited wars are defined by self imposed restraints on the use of power. The nation does not utilize the most destructive weapons in its arsenal and

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<sup>46</sup> Kecskemeti, 219.

<sup>47</sup> Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, (New York: Basic Books, 2002), xv-xvi.

it does not fully mobilize its people to fight these wars. Although this allows the public to be relatively free from sacrifice in fighting limited wars, it also means that the passion of the people will not remain high. Lengthy fighting and images of prolonged destruction will drain the national will, and the people will eventually demand an end to the fighting and an exit strategy to restore the peace. Vietnam is a classic example of a limited war that continued too long for the public to support. Limited wars are also classified by the increased importance of the policy makers instead of the military. Whereas in total war, a “firebreak” between policy and the military could be established, in limited war, the conduct of the war is more reliant on policy than on the military. This means that the military and the policy makers must work closely together and there must be an overlap into both realms. The military cannot execute its own plan without close coordination with the policy makers every step of the way. This fact in itself creates a more difficult environment where both the policy makers and the military may feel the need to resist the other or overstep their bounds and try to manage too much. And finally, limited wars need to have a defined exit strategy. Since defeat of the enemy nation’s will is too costly and time consuming, then other defined objectives must be established. This provides both the military and the public a reasonable timeline and set of goals to be met to ensure that the limited war is making progress and will have an obtainable conclusion.

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.<sup>48</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

Is it possible that many of the problems in the situation in Iraq today are because the war was not properly defined? Operation Iraqi Freedom was presented to the people as part of the Global War on Terror, which can be argued as a war for our national survival. That could be a cause to fight it as a total war, but half the nation and one political party is convinced that OIF is a war of choice, specifically a war of interest (oil) or honor (Saddam’s thumbing his nose at the

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<sup>48</sup> Clausewitz, 88.



United States since Operation Desert Storm). OIF is also characterized by other factors that seem to suggest it is a limited War. Specifically, the US has fought it with self-imposed restraints on our national power. We have not mobilized the nation and have focused the sacrifice squarely on the shoulders of the US military. The policy makers have to be closely involved with the military leadership in fighting this war. However, instead of a clear and defined exit strategy that is characteristic of limited wars, the Administration has forced regime change of the Iraqi government and currently has US forces occupying and securing the country. This open ended exit strategy which is focused on defeating the enemy's will to fight and setting the conditions for a lasting peace is more indicative of the goals in total war. Have we looked to obtain the outcome that total war creates by fighting with limited war restrictions?

## **JULY 1945 AGAIN?**

There is no doubt that the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan was a military revolution. On one level, the atomic bombings could be categorized as part of Douhet's theory of strategic bombing, which was to attack civilian targets and the will of the people will crumble. Although previous attempts at strategic bombing, including the fire bombing of Tokyo, which killed over 100,000, was not successful, air power theorists believed that with enough firepower the theory was valid. Whether or not the atomic bombs in themselves or a compilation of other factors led to the total defeat of Japan, the bomb in itself created a new paradigm when it came to war fighting.

The atomic bomb could be looked at as the pinnacle of man's ability to destroy life. The industrial age had steadily improved the killing efficiency of weapons. This would make it more costly and bloody in order to destroy an enemy's means to wage war. The atomic bomb seemed to usher in an era where it would be easier to destroy entire population centers, but the amount of destruction would definitely be too costly to think about. Once the Soviets created their atomic

bomb by 1949, the United States' sole dominance over that destructive weapon was gone. With the Cold War now commenced, the United States and the Soviet Union would know that a future war between them would probably result in a nuclear exchange before one side capitulated.

Bernard Brodie, in his work, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, summed up the situation. He recognized the impending arms race and realized that the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was the only rational deterrent that would avoid nuclear war between the superpowers.<sup>49</sup> He argued that each side had to build up its armaments in order to discourage either side with taking a preventive first strike at the other. As long as each side knew that launching a first strike would result in a devastating retaliatory strike from the other side, there would be no incentive in fighting that type of war. It then would result in a reliance on the other forms of national power, specifically diplomacy, to resolve conflicts between the two superpowers.

Brodie also recognizes that while the nuclear age may serve as a deterrent of warfare fought between the two superpowers, it may also create other such limited conflicts where the superpowers fight by proxy.<sup>50</sup> Conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are perfect examples of such limited conflicts. These conflicts are characterized by the superpower's self restraint on the use of power. The goals of these conflicts became limited in nature since the superpower involved could not use all of its power to destroy the means and the will of the belligerents. For example, in Korea, once the United States and coalition forces pushed into the north, the Chinese became involved. This sent a message that if one side attempted to destroy the enemy's means to fight, the enemy would be supported by his allies and this will make the fight even harder. More importantly, this conflict showed what would appear to be logical escalation. By defeating the Communists of North Korea, the Communists of China entered into the war. The only logical assumption was that the United States would then have to fight into China in order to stop them. Then it could possible progress to the Soviet Union feeling

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<sup>49</sup> Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 228.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 310.

the impending threat on their borders and attempt to halt it by all out conflict or even a nuclear exchange. This paradigm would shape US foreign policy up to 1989, and its residual effects may still linger today.

Nuclear war between the superpowers probably never came as close as it did in October of 1962. Known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, both countries came close to nuclear war because the Soviet Union was making successful gains on being able to have a successful first strike capability without the United States having an ample retaliatory capability. By placing nuclear ballistic missiles in Cuba, the Soviet Union had placed a nuclear threat in the Western Hemisphere and so close to the homeland of the United States. The Soviets would be able to strike the continental United States faster and this would throw the balance of power in their favor. The major lesson from this conflict was that the nuclear threat was real, and the Soviets were actively looking to gain an advantage. The other lesson, which ended up having tremendous effects on US foreign policy, was that it helped to spawn the mistakes that would materialize in Vietnam.

The personalities of statesman and soldiers are such important factors that in war above all it is vital not to underrate them.<sup>51</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

There are many reasons on why the United States became involved in Southeast Asia, and this monograph will not delve that deep into them. The critical piece is how that war in Vietnam was fought and how it helped to shape the American way of war. The first major conclusion that evolved out of Vietnam was the separation between the civilian and military leaders. The entire conflict grew with this separation being exacerbated by the Kennedy administration. Only a few months in office, President Kennedy launched the failed Bay of Pigs attack on Cuba. This dismal failure was a major embarrassment for the new President, who felt that the military leaders had let him down. In order to rectify this situation, President Kennedy

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<sup>51</sup> Clausewitz, 94.

created a special military advisor to the President and named retired General Maxwell Taylor to the post.<sup>52</sup> Taylor had the power to advise the President and could supersede anything proposed by the Joint Chiefs. This atmosphere of distrust between the civilian leadership and the military leadership was exacerbated during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Left with unclear guidance, the Joint Chiefs argued that a preventive bombing strike on the missile sites in Cuba followed by an invasion was the only option left for the President. Secretary of Defense McNamara, also distrustful of military leadership, discounted the Joint Chiefs' recommendation and proposed a quarantine blockade of Soviet ships in the area. During this standoff of 13 days, McNamara's plan was successful and with the help of Attorney General Robert Kennedy's backdoor concessions to the Soviets, nuclear conflict between the two superpowers was averted.

Two major developments came out of this crisis, which ended up shaping the military and the American way of war. First, the distrust of the military leadership helped to foster an environment where their advice was discounted. Since McNamara was completely convinced that the military leadership had nothing to offer, he felt the missile crisis had confirmed his belief. He then believed that he and his "whiz kids" had created a new doctrine of dealing with the Soviets, namely "graduated pressure."<sup>53</sup>

Graduated pressure was a way to get away from the "all or nothing" doctrine of the United States. Once the Soviets had perfected their nuclear weapon, the Eisenhower Administration realized that MAD would be a rational way to stabilize the tense situation between the two superpowers. If the United States went to total war, it would result in a nuclear exchange. This helped to archive the lessons learned from World War II on how to completely and effectively defeat an enemy. Martial law, unconditional surrender and occupation were all obsolete in the nuclear age. It was obvious that a total war would bring about such destruction that human existence on this planet would be in question. Policies on how to ensure the defeat of

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<sup>52</sup> H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), 9.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 62.

the enemy were vaporized as quickly a thermonuclear blast as all efforts were placed on two things. How to avoid the nuclear exchange and who would survive after the mushroom cloud? By 1960, President Kennedy did not like the fact that he had only two options on the table when it came to dealing with the Soviets.<sup>54</sup> They were to go to war and go nuclear, or to do nothing. Kennedy's interest and subsequent creation of the Special Forces was to generate another option. This was to create a force that could fight unconventionally and possible give those smaller nations an ability to resist Communism. The evolution that occurs here is that total war and the big Army are now relegated to the option that no one wants to happen. A superpower conventional force-on-force fight that will ultimately end in a nuclear exchange is what defines the total war end of the spectrum. Limited wars seem like the only other option to fight in order to achieve limited goals and avoid nuclear confrontation.

Although the conventional force-on-force fight seems impossible in the Cold War because of its perceived destructive final outcome, the US military establishment continued to focus its efforts in that area. Through out the Cold War, the US fielded a conventional force and a nuclear arsenal in order to first deter Soviet aggression and then to beat back the Soviets if it escalated to war. This mentality had created the fixation with a large conventional force, armed with the most lethal equipment that can destroy an opponent's means to wage war. Another key aspect during the Cold War is the posture and doctrine of the US military. Based upon the doctrine of "Active Defense," this conventional force had the main objective to stop the invading Red Horde in the Fulda Gap and across the plains of Europe. Policy makers and military leaders were focused on creating a defensive force that could fight and win a conventional battle and maintain a defense of the countries of Europe. The attention was on our ability to destroy the Soviet conventional means to fight. After beating back a Soviet attack and a possible nuclear

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 10-11.

exchange, the policy makers may have assumed that the Soviets' will to fight would be defeated as well.

The superpowers with their nuclear arsenals changed the ways others would fight as well. In 1973, when the Egyptians and the Syrians attacked Israel, war in the Middle East became the interest of the superpowers. The United States backed and continued to supply Israel to fight off the invaders while the Soviet Union backed the Arabs. When the Soviets made overtures that they would get more involved to ensure the defeat of the Israelis, President Nixon raised the nation's defense condition to four, the highest readiness alert. The crisis was averted with both sides backing down, and the Israelis ceased combat operations after beating back both the Syrians and the Egyptians. The main conclusion out of this conflict was that wars between nations would eventually suck the superpowers into them by proxy. In essence, the world was divided up like a chess board. Each country in the world that had strategic significance had to choose which side it would join, either the US or the USSR. Therefore, if that country were attacked, it would be protected by its sponsor. The Yom Kippur war of 1973 reinforced the doctrine in the United States that the military should be prepared to fight a conventional war where it can destroy the means of the enemy on the battlefield. Israel and all the other nations backed by the United States were ones that were on a defensive footing, which were just trying to maintain the status quo and defend against Communist expansion. It is further evidence on why the US doctrine was defensive in nature and why invading, occupying and defeating a nation's will to fight were not even considered.

Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that has created war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political.<sup>55</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

After the Vietnam experience, where the United States was not at all pleased with the outcome, there was a lot of soul searching within the government and the military. There was a

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<sup>55</sup> Clausewitz, 607.

resurgence of Carl von Clausewitz because of his writings on the connection between the military and the policy makers. Many critics stated that the military won all its fights in Vietnam, but they were not tied to an overall strategy to win the war due to the fault of the government. There was also deep criticism on how President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara disregarded military advice and were picking bombing targets from the White House. McNamara was definitely responsible for his graduated pressure doctrine, which he felt would surely bring Hanoi to the peace table. Since his theory had worked in the Cuban Missile Crisis, he felt it was the best way to prosecute the war in Southeast Asia. This way, China and the Soviet Union would not be drawn into the conflict and Hanoi would be gradually pressured into ceasing its aid to the Viet Cong in the south. The military was obviously disconnected from this strategy due to their focus on defeating an enemy's means and then will to fight. In order to defeat the means and will of Hanoi, they would have had to go on the offensive and attack north. However, the Defense Secretary and the President had imposed restraints, which would not allow the military to fight like that. With the objectives in this limited war very obscure, the military did its best to do what it was trained to do. That was to find the enemy, engage him and destroy his means to fight. Since this war was defensive in nature, the military never focused on invading, occupying, or defeating the enemy's will to fight. It became an attrition fight where the US military focused on killing more of the enemy than they had lost. Unfortunately, body counts became the only metric for the military to gauge any type of success. The fallout of this conflict is a feeling that bad things happen when military advice is ignored and the civilian leadership becomes too involved with tactical military operations. The other obvious fallout is that the military does not like these limited wars. These wars are fought by the military without much popular support back home and the government enforces a self imposed restraint on its power to fight the enemy to completely defeat him. The ramifications of this conflict still echo today.

By the mid 1970s the leaders in the US Army found themselves in a very precarious situation. Vietnam was a loser. Not only did it have undesirable results, but also it had

decimated the morale of the force and left it in shambles. By the end of the decade, Chief of Staff Edward “Shy” Meyer would tell the House Armed Services Committee that the US Army was a hollow force because it was ill-manned, ill-equipped, and ill-trained. The Yom Kippur War also was a preview for Army leadership on how US forces may fare in a conventional fight with the Soviet Union. The Israelis, equipped with US equipment and doctrine, found the first days quite difficult for them as their Egyptian counterpart armed with Soviet weaponry were able to decimate Israeli counterattacks with effective anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. This war helped to refocus the US military on its mission. The military became more focused on fighting a total war with the Soviet Union and steered away from getting into any more of those messy limited wars. Since the United States had no plans or desires to invade Communist bloc countries, it became easier for the leadership to focus the military. They had to concentrate on defeating an enemy’s means to fight. Defeat their forces on the battlefield and push them back into Eastern Europe. There was never any focus or need to focus for that matter on defeating the enemy’s will to fight through invasion and occupation.

In October of 1983, terrorists in Lebanon drove a truck bomb into a hotel that US Marines were utilizing as barracks. 241 Marines lost their lives and it was foreshadowing the events of the US fighting against Islamofascist terrorism across the globe. At the time, this devastating attack caused Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to reflect on the use of American military power. He put together a short list of conditions that must be met in order for the United States to commit its troops to military endeavors.<sup>56</sup> His executive assistant, Colin Powell, later expounded upon these principles and they became known as the Powell Doctrine. It is evident that these principles were directly influenced by the experience in Vietnam. Powell stated that the US should not use military force unless it is in the vital national interest of the United States. He further expounded that the US should always project overwhelming force to

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<sup>56</sup> Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey*, (New York: Random House, 1995), 302-303.



destroy the enemy, establish clear objectives from the policy makers for the military, and establish an exit strategy. The Powell Doctrine took all the bad aspects of the Vietnam experience and created a checklist of conditions that must be met in order to avoid another Vietnam. The problem with these conditions is that the doctrine will make it impossible for the US to get involved in limited wars, and it puts an unrealistic expectation on a total war – an exit strategy. The Powell Doctrine became famous because of its use in Operation Desert Storm. It possibly can be argued that its fixation on that exit strategy resulted in Operation Iraqi Freedom having to be fought 12 years later.

When the wall came tumbling down in November 1989, the United States should have recognized that its paradigm for fighting wars had come crashing down as well. The US went from believing total war with the Soviet Union was unthinkable due to the Mutually Assured Destruction concept to the realization that the Cold War would never escalate to an all out armed conflict with the Soviet Union. Instead of realizing the MAD constraint on our total war paradigm, which had eliminated the need to look at defeating an enemy's will, invading his country, or occupying his land, was gone; the overwhelming feeling was that only the threat was gone. The US military went from a paradigm of total war with nuclear weapons to a situation where there was no peer competitor to force the US into total war. No one foresaw the melding of total war and limited war together and the mutant beast it would create.

Within the Cold War context, countries were either on the side of the United States or the Soviet Union. Neither superpower was concerned with what type of government existed in these countries. As long as that country backed the superpower, allowed overflight rights and possible basing, the superpower looked the other way on how the regime ruled its people. The superpower could leverage the country towards its wishes with financial backing, and the regime kept its end of the bargain by remaining loyal and ensuring its people did not step out of the bounds and upset the balance of powers. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, all of its client states that were financially supported by it were in deep trouble as well. They no longer

could be inefficient nation states waiting for financial aid from the Soviets to bail them out. They had to produce jobs and fit into the global market.<sup>57</sup> This type of work does not happen overnight and the separation of wealth between free market democracies and the old Soviet backed regimes became greater and fueled more hatred and contempt in these regions. Couple this hatred and anger with totalitarian states that possess the means to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction, and the world has shifted from the stable, balanced Cold War where two superpowers maintained a tenuous stability to a world of instability between terrorists and the states that sponsor them.

In the contemporary environment, the United States should look at the world in a pre-August 1945 lens. Nuclear weapons are not feasible for the United States to use. Politically, they would never be justified and it would seem that the US is bent on world domination and the willful extinction of other nations. Limited wars will continue to exist. Haiti is flaring up again and the US may have to use military power once again to bring stability to that area. The real question is that of total war. By definition, the United States does not have a peer competitor to engage in true total war, but that may change in the next decade with military growth in China. President Bush has announced in his vision for the world, that the spreading of democracy and freedom across the globe is the answer to dissolving the disparities between the haves and the have nots and abating the anger felt throughout these poverty regions. In order to execute these missions, the US military must be prepared to fight a hybrid of both total war and limited war.

These future wars will be total in that they will be manpower intensive and the military should focus its operations on defeating both the enemy's means to fight and his will to fight. These wars should be fought around the tenets of the Powell doctrine recognizing however, that the exit strategy should be couched in a timeframe like the occupation of Germany and Japan instead of a Desert Storm or Just Cause. These wars will be limited in the fact that they will be

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<sup>57</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 255.


fought be an all voluntary military and will not mobilize the citizens of the nation directly. The wars will be fought with interest and honor being a higher priority than fear. Although these preemptive wars are for the nation's survival and to destroy threats before they fully materialize, the public will not feel that sense of imminent danger and fear of national survival that would be evident in a true total war. These wars will be limited also because the US will show a self imposed restraint. The US military will be focused on limiting collateral damage and will not use its power to commit wanton destruction to meet its objectives. These limitations will keep the war from becoming total. Since the paradigm has shifted, perhaps there needs to be a new doctrine which could better prepare the military and the policy makers on realistic expectations and criteria for waging such a conflict.

## WAY OF WAR: SYSTEMS SHOCK

But since the essence of war is fighting, and since the battle is the fight of the main force, the battle must always be considered as the true center of gravity of the war.<sup>58</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

When preparing to wage war against a nation, the US policy makers and military leaders should focus the plan on the nation's system and not look for one center of gravity that will supposedly translate to success. In order to attack the nation's entire system, interagency coordination is entirely necessary and that reform will not be covered in this monograph. The following diagram is an example of a nation's system:



The nation's system is made up of these various components and they are interrelated. However, focusing and attacking one does not achieve the strategic aims that we may be looking for. Also,

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<sup>58</sup> Clausewitz, 248.

the military as it is currently structured cannot effect the necessary change needed in each one of these. The military has been built around and is proficient in destroying the nation's opposing military. This will enable it to conduct a regime change by either capturing or forcing the flight of the regime's previous leaders. The military should initially fill this leadership vacuum by establishing martial law. Close coordination with the State Department should transition the nation to an interim government followed by democratic style free elections. The security situation is going to require the US military to occupy the country with either the troops that destroyed the enemy's military or a constabulary force that is prepared to perform more of a policing type mission as opposed to conventional combat. The infrastructure will need to be repaired or maintained. Ensuring that electricity, water, sewer and other such amenities are available is critical to helping to stabilize the situation. The economy needs to be resuscitated with the main goal of producing jobs for the citizens. Without jobs and money to provide for their own well being or that of their families, individuals will become disenchanting with the current situation and most likely will turn to violence as an expression of their hopeless situation.

To further stabilize the region, an intensive Information Operations campaign must be waged. Messages such as the reconstruction projects, jobs available, and greater opportunities must be conveyed to the people. A campaign must also be waged in order to discredit or shut down disinformation that is focused on discrediting the liberation and occupation force and instigating violence. The other important factor is the culture of the people of the region. Obviously, the awareness and sensitivities to a people's culture are important to an occupying force. A concerted effort must be done to honor that culture and not attempt to infringe on it. A people's culture is their one touchstone to their heritage and the past, and anything that is perceived to be exterminating it or changing it will be met with extreme resistance. All of these parts are interconnected and may be one way of determining how to destroy an enemy's will to fight. Parts of the system will need to be taken down such as the military and the regime. Other parts will need to be built up such as the economy and possibly the infrastructure. And finally,

other parts such as the culture must be kept as the status quo. A concerted interagency effort needs to simultaneously “attack” each part of the system. This may produce system “shock,” which can allow a brief period of paralysis where it may give US forces the time needed to tear down and prop up the different aspects needed to restore order. It is imperative that this problem be treated as a system to avoid the focusing of efforts at only one component or trying to deal with each one of the components in a sequential order.

Still, no matter what the central feature of the enemy’s power may be—the point on which your efforts must converge—the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin, and in every case will be a very significant feature of the campaign.<sup>59</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

Operation Iraqi Freedom seems to have violated this systems approach and attempted to liberate the Iraqi people in a linear fashion. First, the military would destroy the regime’s forces, specifically the Republican Guard forces. The defeat of the Iraqi military and the occupation of Baghdad would target Saddam Hussein’s center of gravity and he would be defeated. Although he fled and hid from the US led coalition only to be captured nine months later, his regime was no longer in charge after M1 tanks rolled down the streets of Baghdad. This was followed by the slow change over of power from retired LTG (Retired) Jay Garner to L. Paul Bremer from the State Department. Infrastructure maintenance and repair and jobs for the Iraqi people were being addressed but not as the high priority of the US military. Security was definitely an afterthought since the troops used to capture Baghdad may have been able to mass their effects to destroy enemy forces, but were not in the quantity needed to prevent the subsequent looting and crime. After the defeat of the Iraqi military and the regime change, the US military then transitioned to Phase IV operations, which it was not completely prepared to do. Phase III was seen as the decisive operation that entailed the defeat of the Iraqi military. However, the decisive operation in regime change is not unseating the dictator, it is the effective

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<sup>59</sup> Clausewitz, 596.

replacement government taking control of the country.<sup>60</sup> Critics of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Bush Administration argued that perhaps the destruction of the Iraqi military was not necessary at all since Phase IV is the true decisive operation and their military could serve as part of the new government's security forces. Although this theory may generate some discussion, the US military would never risk leaving an enemy's military intact in some form to be able to threaten the coalition forces. It would be politically unacceptable for the President to risk the failure of a regime change operation because our military did not destroy the enemy's military means when they had the chance. "To occupy land before his armies are defeated should be considered at best a necessary evil," would become a resurrected Clausewitz quote to criticize the Administration's war plan as being tremendously flawed.<sup>61</sup> Clausewitz was right when he stated that the destruction of both the means and the will to resist will result in victory in war. It may seem linear in thinking, but destroying an enemy's means to fight is the most expedient way to create the conditions towards his ultimate defeat. It is necessary, but perhaps should not be the primary focus.

Phase III operations are focused around the destruction of the enemy's means to fight. Our military has been trained and equipped to do just that, and is more efficient at doing it than any other in the world. However, Phase IV operations are focused on the defeat of his will to resist and this task is greater than the military can handle alone. This is where the nation must be regarded as a system and interagency collaboration is imperative for the simultaneous application of both 'carrots' and 'sticks' to the various facets of the nation. Simply put, Phase III can be done by the Defense Department working autonomously. However, Phase IV is where Defense, State and other agencies must work together.<sup>62</sup> Due to different bureaucratic cultures and the fact that they have not been forced to work together on a project this enormous since the

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<sup>60</sup> Frederick W. Kagan, "War and Aftermath," *Policy Review* 120, August 2003, 5.

<sup>61</sup> Clausewitz, 92.

<sup>62</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, "Indian Country," *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 September 2004, A22.

occupation of Germany and Japan, it is quite obvious to see why interagency cooperation in “winning the peace” in Iraq has been so difficult.

## CONCLUSION

No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective.<sup>63</sup>

-Carl von Clausewitz

So how do we convince an enemy to accept defeat after they have lost the operational fight? In order to achieve that total, decisive victory, we must not only defeat the enemy’s means to fight, but also his will to fight. The American military has been developed over the years to become the best fighting force in world’s history in destroying an enemy’s military. Due to a myriad of factors, the US military has the best equipped and best trained fighting force in the world and can destroy any enemy it is put up against. However, the military has not been able to successfully translate that warfighting prowess into being able to shatter an enemy’s will to resist. Theorists, mostly in the air power realm, have looked for technological ways to decimate an enemy’s will to fight by shocking them from the air. From Douhet’s theory of targeting civilian population centers to the recently displayed “shock and awe” campaign in OIF, the technological solution has always seemed to fall short. In World War II, President Roosevelt recognized that the way to break the will of the people was to occupy their country and take over their government. This was his rationale behind unconditional surrender, which was meant to ensure that the people of the defeated nation knew that they had truly lost. Although the policy of unconditional surrender was flawed and not strictly enforced, it served its purpose of focusing the nation on defeating an enemy’s military and occupying their countries to ensure their will was broken and a lasting peace could be created. The American way of war has overlooked the lessons from World War II because it was a total war, and during the Cold War, a total war equaled mutually assured destruction. The US military became fixated on fighting small limited

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<sup>63</sup> Clausewitz, 579.



wars and an Active Defense in Europe with the focus of being able to destroy an attacking enemy's military means to fight. The US military evolved and became very proficient at executing that task. However, no one recognized that when the Berlin wall came crashing down, so should have our paradigms on fighting war. It was not widely recognized, embraced, or encouraged that the US would find itself engaging in future conflicts that would look for total war outcomes (defeat of both enemy means and will to resist) through a limited war force structure. Therefore, the answer for future conflicts is to first recognize the fight that we are getting into. Technological advances have increased our ability to destroy an enemy's means to fight, but they offer us very little in defeating his will to fight. The American way of war must embrace and create a force structure that is able to quickly shock an enemy nation's system. The US and coalition forces must be able to destroy an enemy's military, take down their regime and provide security and martial law initially for the people. Simultaneously, the infrastructure and services within the nation have to be quickly repaired and maintained, the culture of the nation must not be trampled upon, and the economy needs to rapidly produce jobs and commerce. In addition, the media and information outlets have to accurately depict the situation and assuage the fears of the people and provide a vision of their independent future.

This, obviously, is a tall order. It cannot be done by the US military only. This requires tremendous joint, interagency and multinational coalition expertise and coordination to properly pull it off. The key to defeating the will of the people is to engage them personally. War is a human endeavor that cannot be relegated to science theories or technological solutions. Phase III operations must continue to emphasize and focus on the destruction of the enemy's means to fight, however, an emphasis with interagency vigor must be placed on Phase IV operations where the enemy's will to fight is targeted and broken. We can win battles and campaigns by destroying an enemy's means to fight, however, to win the war we must ultimately defeat his will to fight.

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